December 8, 1941, marks the last time the United States Congress declared war. Taking into account US intervention in Korea, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Kuwait, Libya, Kosovo, Somalia, and many more over the course of 85 years, this may come as a shock. Nonetheless, all of these conflicts were not backed by an official proclamation of war, and February of 2026 saw one more added to the list: the war in Iran.
On February 28, 2026, the United States and Israel launched surprise airstrikes on multiple sites and cities across Iran, killing the Islamic theocracy’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei along with numerous other Iranian officials. Surviving the strike, Mojtaba Khamenei – Ali Khamenei’s son – has reportedly replaced his father as the current Supreme Leader, although his rare public appearances have created speculation about the state of his health. Meanwhile, strikes have continued, with Israel and the U.S. in conjunction having hit well above 10,000 total targets.
The most mentioned objective behind this war – cited by U.S. and Israeli officials alike – is to “ensure that Iran does not obtain a nuclear weapon” (Trump). With the majority of its 400-440 kg of Uranium capable of fueling a bomb, Iran technically had (and possibly still has) the capability to build around 10 nuclear weapons – assuming they eventually decided to take the last few production steps needed (PBS).
To prevent Iran from capitalizing on its nuclear capabilities (although there was no guarantee it would), Israel and the United States bombed Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan – all major Uranium enrichment sites in the country. What did this yield?
While some Israeli officials claim Iran has lost the capability to make its Uranium weapons-ready, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) claims nearly weapons-grade Uranium likely still exists at key Iranian sites, although production capacity is likely to be hindered following all the attacks. Clearly, there is discourse regarding the extent to which the US and Israel have succeeded in their “main” objective. The extent becomes even harder to measure when considering other goals the US has voiced around Iran: destroying its ballistic missiles, weakening its military and navy, reducing its regional influence and proxy groups, and potentially destabilizing its regime. While US confidence seems to be a veneer for a whole lot of uncertainty, one question continues to be asked: when is this war going to end?
As predictions concerning the length of the war continue to vary depending on what government official is interviewed – as well as what day of the week Trump is confronted – it is hard to deduce whether the United States is pursuing “unconditional surrender” or just aiming to de-stabilize Iran enough to prevent future nuclear-weapons production. Either way, the war continues into its third week, and strikes continue as Iran allegedly becomes more de-stabilized.
Without the missile capacity to reach the U.S. nor planes to carry missiles into the country, Iran cannot attack the U.S. directly. Who it can attack is Israel, and Iran has done just that through ballistic missile and drone operations on several of its cities. It has also attacked the U.S. indirectly, through attempted destruction of its military bases across the Middle East. In trying to bring the global arena of states into the conflict – and thereby put pressure on them to oppose the U.S. and Israel – it has also attacked nearby Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Azerbaijan, and Oman, in an attempt to destabilize their economies to the fullest possible extent. It’s even gone as far as to attack UK bases in Cyprus and British territory Diego Garcia, roping Europe into the conflict. While these attacks are not witnessed directly by U.S. citizens, the effects that are visible – the rising gas prices – come from Israel’s final line of defense: the partial blocking of the Persian Gulf Strait of Hormuz, pressuring the region through which 20% of global oil supply passes. While such action aids Russia – one of Iran’s only strategic partners and a major oil producer – it harms its other partner, China, although the latter’s steady transition to renewable energy helps to mitigate the effect. In the words of IB Global Politics teacher Ms. Dikes, Iran is “weaponizing interdependence” to achieve its goals.
While Iran has neutral trading partners and strategic partner states, they would fight in Iran’s stead. This lack of support raises a question: what is the strength of a state with no true military allies? Although Iran has more than one, evident by its multi-layered defense system, its network of proxies – comprising Hezbollah in Lebanon, Iraqi militias, Houthis in Yemen, and Palestinian groups – is arguably its biggest strength, allowing Iran to fight in multiple states at once. Additionally, the Iranian regime’s use of digital control – encompassing internet shutdowns and platform restrictions – has made protest coordination and other forms of rebellion significantly more difficult. Not to mention, many are still likely scarred by Iran’s violent response to major protests in January of 2026 – the murder of thousands to tens of thousands of civilians cannot be easily forgotten.
All in all, Iran, Israel, and the U.S. all have weapons of destruction and the desire to continue fighting. That being said, Trump’ s changing views on when the war will end is representative of the truth: no one knows. Nonetheless, increased economic turmoil brought about by the war will not be tolerated by the global community for forever, and the U. S’s course of action has sparked discourse among the American public. Whether this will encourage an end to the war is uncertain, but everyone certainly hopes the end is near.
